Question Four. Whether the Blessed Know the Prayers we Offer to Them

163. Lastly I ask whether the blessed know the prayers that we offer to them.

164. That they do not:

Isaiah 63.16, “Abraham did not know us and Israel has ignored us.”a And Jerome On Isaiah there (look in the original).“You, Lord, who have bestowed so much on your people.. .that you considered us worthy to be fellows also of your Spirit, now too hear from heaven and see our works, if yet they are worthy of you. Why do you turn your face from us?” ²²

a.a [Interpolation] There “Augustine says that the dead do not know, indeed the saints do not know, what the living do, even their sons” [Gloss, from Nicholas of Lyra].

165. Again, God alone knows secrets; mental prayer, which is most acceptable to God, is of this sort;     therefore etc     .

166. Again, they do not need to know save for the purpose that they may pray for us; but the consequent is unacceptable, because they are not in state of merit; therefore they cannot pray, because in prayer, per se, consists merit.

167. On the contrary:

This is an error that Jerome touches on in his Epistle to Vigilantius chs.4-11.

I. To the Question

168. Here three things must be looked at:

First, whether the blessed know our prayers by natural cognition; second, whether by supernatural cognition; third, whether, as knowing them, they pray for us.

A. Whether the Blessed Know our Prayers by Natural Cognition

169. The first was touched on in the solution of the second question of this distinction [nn.62-67], about how the separate soul can acquire knowledge not only abstractive but also intuitive, not only of sensibles (as the conjoined soul can [n.50]) but also of any intelligibles that are proportioned and proportionately present. What is proportioned to the separate soul is any created intelligible; therefore prayer, whether vocal (which the conjoined soul too could know through the bodily senses) or also mental (which will then be proportioned to the separate soul), it will be able to know intuitively for that ‘then’, provided however that extreme distance not get in the way, which was touched on in the second question [n.67].

170. Nor is it valid to say that the intellect’s own proper act is hidden from every creature, and its act of will hidden for equal reason, because these acts are intimate to the creature and consequently nothing can know them save what is intimate to the creature; such is God alone, who is immanent [in creatures]. This argument is not sound, because it is manifest that my intellect can know every act of my will; but another intellect, created more perfect, has power for the object that my intellect has power for, if a determinate order to other intelligibles, or defect of proportioned presence, does not get in the way.

171. Now the separate intellect is as equally perfect as the conjoined intellect, or more perfect, and it is not by any order determined to not knowing the operations of another intellect or will; nor is the requisite presence necessarily lacking, because this can exist without immanence; otherwise an angel could have no presence made demonstrable in respect of another than himself, since an angel is immanent to none, for this is repugnant to a creature.

172. As to your saying ‘such operation is intimate’ [n.170] - I reply: essence is more intimate to the intellect than operation, and yet another separate intellect can understand this essence. Nor is it valid to say ‘this is intimate by inherence or, what is more, by being, therefore nothing knows it save what is intimate by immanence’. Indeed, the reasoning seems to proceed as if what is extrinsic to a thing more than what is intrinsic and spiritual could be known by a separate intellect, which is not true; indeed the intelligible essence of a thing or its intrinsic operation is an object more proportioned to the separate intellect than any sense object, because to a pure intellect a pure intelligible is a more proportioned intelligible, provided however it is finite.

173. If you object that the conjoined and separate intellect have the same first object, but operation is not contained under the first object of the conjoined intellect, therefore not under the object of the separate intellect either - I reply: it was said elsewhere that the first object of the intellect as it is such a power is more general than the object that moves it in this present state; andPunctuating the Latin as in the translation and not as in the printed text, whose sense is obscure. ²³ any created being is contained under the first object taken in the first way but not under the object taken in the second way. And the reason is that now it is determinately moved by sensibles, or by what is abstracted from them, because of its immediate order to the imaginative power, which will not exist then. Taking first object in the first way, then, the major [sc. ‘conjoined and separate intellect have the same first object’] is true and the minor [sc. ‘operation is not contained under the first object of the conjoined intellect’] is false; taking it in the second way, the minor is true and the major false.

B. Whether the Blessed Know our Prayers by Supernatural Cognition

174. About the second article [n.168] I say that it is not necessary by reason of beatitude that the blessed regularly or universally see our prayers: not in the Word (because seeing our prayers is not something that is as it were a necessary accompaniment of beatitude), nor that the prayers be revealed to the blessed (because neither does such revelation necessarily follow beatitude). For beatitude of intellect in created objects does not go beyond quiddities, or things whose seen essence is the necessary reason for seeing them.

175. However, because it is fitting for the blessed to be fellow helpers of God in procuring the salvation of the elect, or leading them to salvation, and to do so in the way that this can belong to them - and for this is required that our prayers be revealed to them, especially those that are offered to them, because these prayers specifically rely on the merits of the blessed as on one who is a mediator leading us to the salvation that is being requested; therefore it is probable that God reveal to the blessed the prayers offered to them or to God in their name.

C. Whether, Knowing our Prayers, the Blessed Pray for us

176. About the third article [n.168] I say it seems doubtful, because if it is revealed to them that such and such a person is seeking salvation through them, or anything pertaining to salvation, then either they see that God wills such a person to be saved or wills against it or non-wills;Latin has two ways of negating ‘to will’ or velle’, namely non velle and nolle. Scotus uses the first to mean simple negation, or not having an act of will, and the second for positive negation, or having an act of will against something. The English ‘I do not want/will’ is ambiguous as between these two. To bring out the difference where it is relevant for Scotus’ meaning (for nolle can sometimes connote simple negation), the translation uses, perhaps a little awkwardly, ‘will against’ for nolle and ‘not want/will’ for non velle. ²⁴ if God wills it, then they know such a one will be saved, so they pray in vain; if God wills against it, they won’t pray for anything willed against by God; if God non-wills, they know it would not happen, so they would pray in vain.

I reply: the statement ‘the blessed pray for someone’ can be understood either of habitual prayer or of actual prayer (and we are speaking here only of mental prayer, which is desire offered to God with the intention that it be held as accepted by him). If of habitual prayer, this is perpetual and general for all the elect (but about this there is no difficulty); if of actual prayer, some saint has this prayer specifically when it is revealed to him that someone is invoking him, because it is reasonable that he should want his merits to avail the latter for salvation when he specifically invokes God to help this latter through his merits.

177. Now this prayer is not repugnant to beatitude, because someone who has attained supreme perfection can very well wish that, through his own merits whereby he has attained that perfection, another should attain it by his prayer, so that his merits should be proper not only to himself alone but should, by the benevolence of God’s acceptance, avail for another. Just like someone who has attained by his services the supreme degree in friendship of a king could want to pray for others, not so that through that prayer he may attain a greater degree of friendship [sc. for himself], but so that the merits by which he attains such degree may be of aid to others, who have recourse to those merits - and this, on the supposition of his liberality, namely the king’s, in accepting them, not only for him but (by the king’s liberality) for others, whereby for a lesser good he returns not only a greater good but also more goods, provided however that, by a new act of will, many apply this good to themselves and, as it were, make it their own.

178. When therefore you argue “the blessed see that God either wills or non-wills or wills against” [n.176], I reply: it is not necessary to grant any of these options - not, surely, as to the final salvation of him who prays, but not even as to the hearing of the prayer that he now prays. For this does not follow: God reveals to Peter that John is now asking for a through the merits of Peter, therefore it is revealed to Peter that John is to be saved or not to be saved; nor does this follow: therefore it is revealed that John is to be heard or not to be heard in this petition. However let it be that it were revealed to him that this person is to be heard or not heard in this petition; it does not follow that therefore he prays in vain, because just as God wants to save him, or hear him, so he wants to achieve this through determinate means (namely through the prayer of such a blessed). But if it be revealed to Peter determinately that God wills against hearing this prayer, Peter would not be a mediator for John in praying; but if it not be revealed to Peter that God wills nor revealed that he wills against, Peter prays expecting that a determinate revelation of his being heard would follow his prayer, or at least a determinate effect of his being heard as to his own asking.

II. To the Initial Arguments

179. To the first principal argument [n.164] I say that Abraham, at the time for which Isaiah 63.16 is meant, was in limbo, and consequently not blessed, and therefore he did not know his Jewish sons living in the land of Israel; for he did not know by intuitive knowledge (which was impeded by the extreme distance, as was said in that second question, nn.169, 67), nor by knowledge of special revelation, because he did not have that vision in the Word which such revelation regularly accompanies. The argument, therefore, does not hold of the blessed, to whom are regularly revealed in the Word the things that concern them, whether as increasing their beatitude or as pertaining to their causality with respect to the beatitude of others.

180. To the second [n.165] I say that there is not anything in the mind, namely any operation of intellect or will and any property or real condition of either of them, without the whole of it lying open to an unimpeded angel proportionally present, or to an unimpeded soul proportionally present - just as a present whiteness is apparent to a conjoined soul through the senses.

The statement, then, that “God alone knows the hidden things of the heart” [n.165, Psalm 43.22] is true universally and by his proper perfection, such that it is impossible that they be hid from him by any impediment. He also knows them as universal Judge of all such hidden things, in this way knowing them as neither the good angels nor the bad angels nor separate souls know them. Indeed, as a matter of fact, the blessed do not know many such movements because of lack of due presence, and the bad angels do not know many such things, even those that are proportionally present, as God prevents them and, because of his prevention, they cannot do many things that yet could not be naturally prevented.

181. To the third [n.166] I say that our prayer now has a double effect: one because it is meritorious for him who prays, indeed is a natural meritorious work; the other because, from the fact it is directed specifically on behalf of another, it is meritorious for him for whom it is offered. And the blessed do not have prayer in the first way but in the second. Nor is it unacceptable for someone, who is now, as to himself, at his final goal, to merit for another by his prayer; just as we see in polities, where a king gives what he wants but he wants to give it through the intercession of another to someone who would not be worthy to be heard immediately; and he most wants to give it if someone intercedes who has most acceptance with him, which accepted person yet merits no greater degree of friendship with him.

182. It could be said in another way (and it returns as it were to the same) that just as someone blessed obtains things for others and not for himself, so he causes merit for others and not for himself; for his prayer is a disposition by way of congruity, so that through it God grants to him for whom he asks what he obtains; and so his merit is not for himself but for him to whom is rendered what, as if in place of an immediate reward, corresponds to this merit.